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THE CAMBODIAN AMNESTIES: BENEFICIARIES
AND THE TEMPORAL REACH OF AMNESTIES
FOR GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
RONALD C. SLYE'
The Cambodian government passed two successive amnes-
ties in the last decade in response to the lingering question of
how to respond to the legacy of the Khmer Rouge. Negotiations
aimed at creating a judicial mechanism for holding individuals
accountable for atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge have
lurched forward and backward, while international criminal trials
for gross violations of human rights have become more common
in the last decade. However, until recently the Cambodian gov-
ernment's primary response to those responsible for one of the
worst acts of violence in human history has been the passage of
these two amnesties. Cambodia has thus adopted a consistent
and official policy of impunity and amnesia.
Cambodia is not alone in preferring amnesty in response to
a legacy of hatred and violence. Virtually every country that has
emerged from a history of widespread violations of fundamental
rights has preferred amnesty to prosecutions and other forms of
accountability. While state preference for amnesty is common,
there is large variation among states with respect to the type of
amnesty promulgated. The self-amnesty passed by the Chilean
military dictator Pinochet in 1978 is fundamentally different from
the amnesty administered by the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission in South Africa from 1996 to 2001. The Chilean amnesty
was a blanket one, intended to shield government officials from
any form of accountability. The South African amnesty was
much more sophisticated, legislated by a newly elected and dem-
ocratic Parliament to provide some truth and accountability for
crimes committed during the apartheid era. South Africa re-
quired full disclosure as a condition for amnesty, thus transform-
ing amnesty from a truth-hiding to truth-revealing mechanism.
On the continuum represented by the Chilean and South African
amnesties, the Cambodian amnesties fall closer to the Chilean
end of the spectrum as they are designed to entrench impunity
and discourage even the most minimally-required investigation
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and accountability. Thus, they discourage, rather than further,
justice.
What makes the Cambodian amnesties unjust? Typically an
amnesty has two consequences: 1) it prevents the criminal prose-
cution and punishment of perpetrators, and 2) it prevents victims
from seeking damages, truth, and other forms of accountability
from those responsible for the violation of their rights. There is
some debate over whether international law obliges, or even
should oblige, the prosecution and punishment of those responsi-
ble for gross violations of human rights. There is general agree-
ment, however, that international law requires something more
than the typical amnesty provides. At a minimum, justice re-
quires some form of accountability and some form of recognition
of the harm suffered by victims. The Cambodian amnesties pro-
vide neither.
Rather than discussing what international law and morality
require with respect to accountability, 2 I will discuss two impor-
tant choices facing drafters of an amnesty: 1) who should be pro-
tected by an amnesty; and 2) how long such an amnesty should
last. The first question concerns amnesty beneficiaries, and is a
relatively common one raised by those who draft and study
amnesties. The second question concerns the temporal nature of
the amnesty. It is rarely, if ever, considered by either drafters or
observers because drafters invariably intend their amnesties to
be immediate and permanent. The beneficiary question is di-
rectly raised by the content of the Cambodian amnesties; the
temporal question is raised by the history of accountability and
amnesty in Cambodia and other transitional societies. Both have
important implications for determining the legitimacy of an
amnesty.
2 For a good discussion of what international law requires with respect to amnes-
ties, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudence of
Amnesty, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 843 (1998); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prose-
cute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449
(1990).
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THE CAMBODIAN AMNESTIES
In 1994, the Cambodian government passed legislation ban-
ning the Khmer Rouge and providing amnesty to Khmer Rouge
guerrillas who defected to the government between July 7, 1994
to January 7, 1995.' The amnesty provision states:
This law shall allow for an amnesty period of six months
after coming into effect to permit the people who are
members of the political organization or military forces of
the "democratic Kampuchea Group" [i.e. the Khmer
Rouge] to return to live under the authority in the Royal
Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, without facing
punishment for crimes which they have committed.4
The 1994 amnesty does not apply to "leaders" of the Khmer
Rouge,5 and appears to give some discretion to King Norodom
Sihanouk in determining who is granted amnesty and whether
the individual amnesty grant is a full or partial one.6 In addition
to providing amnesty for any crimes they may have committed,
members of the Khmer Rouge are subjected to new liabilities
under the 1994 legislation based solely on their membership.
Two years after this first amnesty, on 14 September 1996, the
King issued a royal decree granting amnesty to the former Dep-
uty Prime Minister of the Khmer Rouge government, leng Sary.
The two Prime Ministers, Norodom Ranaridh (the King's son)
and Hun Sen (a former official in the Khmer Rouge government)
requested the Sary amnesty. The amnesty was granted in return
"Anette Marcher, Rin Verdict Leads to KR Tribunal Doubts, 9/15 PHNOM PENH
POST (July 21-Aug. 3, 2000). An estimated 6,600 members of the Khmer Rouge
took advantage of the amnesty provision and defected to the government. Id.
The Law on Outlawing the Group of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 5 (July 7,
1994), reprinted in PHNOM PENH POST, July 21-28, 1994. Some have argued that
the 1994 law was not passed in compliance with the Cambodian Constitution. See
Jan ven der Grinten, The Law on the Outlawing the Group of Democratic
Kampuchea (on file with author). At least one Cambodian court implicitly dis-
agrees, finding the law applicable to a criminal defendant who was accused of
murdering foreign tourists in 1994. See AP, Ex-Khmer Rouge Acquitted of Mur-
der of Tourists, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2000, at 14.
'The Law on Outlawing the Group of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 6 ("For lead-
ers of the 'Democratic Kampuchea' group the amnesty described above does not
apply.").
6 Id. at art. 7 ("The King shall have the right to give partial or complete amnesty as
stated in Article 27 of the Constitution.").
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for Sary's defection from the Khmer Rouge, referred to in the
decree as "the Democratic Kampuchea Group." The relevant
passage of the royal decree reads as follows:
Amnesty is granted to Mr. leng Sary, former Deputy Prime
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs in the Govern-
ment of Democratic Kampuchea, who was sentenced to
death and confiscation of all property by order of the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Court of Phnom Penh dated 19 August
1979 and with regard to penalties stipulated by the Law on
the Outlawing of the Democratic Kampuchea Group
which was promulgated by Royal Proclamation no. 01 BM
94 dated 15 July 1994. 7
The amnesty protects Sary from his conviction in absentia
for gross violations of human rights committed while he was
Deputy Prime Minister for foreign affairs from 1975 to 1979. The
court that convicted leng Sary, along with Pol Pot, was created by
the newly formed Cambodian government that came to power
after the Vietnamese invasion of 1979.8
Although the royal decree speaks of an amnesty, it appears
to grant both an amnesty and a pardon. Pardons provide protec-
tion from liability after a finding of guilt, while amnesties provide
protection prior to any such determination. Assuming that the
reference to the 1979 trial is more than descriptive, the decree
pardons Sary for that conviction. In addition, the decree pro-
vides Sary with an amnesty for his liability arising from member-
ship in the outlawed Democratic Kampuchea Group-liability
created by the 1994 amnesty legislation. Significantly, the am-
nesty does not appear to provide any protection to Sary for any
criminal acts he may have committed or ordered after his 1979
trial and before his defection from the Khmer Rouge in 1996.
The 1994 and 1996 Cambodian amnesties were designed to
entice defections from, and thus weaken, an insurgent army.
Such use of amnesties has been relatively common throughout
history. President Lincoln, for example, issued such an amnesty
Translation of decree on file with author.
8 The trial and conviction of Ieng Sary has been criticized by some as a show trial.
For an excellent discussion, and defense, of the 1979 trial, see the introductory
essay by John Quigley in HOWARD J. DE NIKE ET. AL., GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIAL OF POL POT AND IENG SARY 1-18 (2000).
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during the U.S. Civil War to encourage defections from the Con-
federate army.' The broad use of amnesties during an armed
conflict is often justified as a necessary condition for bringing
about peace and preventing additional gross violations of human
rights. That such amnesties may facilitate the immediate end of
an armed conflict is clear; whether they contribute to the devel-
opment and protection of human rights depends on the type of
amnesty granted. Some amnesties provide some measure of ac-
countability, and thus contribute to the creation of a peaceful
and just society. Other amnesties-in fact, the vast majority of
them-purposefully hinder accountability and entrench a culture
of impunity, thus leading to a superficially peaceful order pre-
cariously built on a foundation of injustice. The Cambodian
amnesties are of the latter type.
In fact Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions encourages the use of amnesties at
the end of an armed conflict to protect combatants from being prosecuted domes-
tically for acts of violence that are lawful under international law. Article 6(5) of
Protocol II states: "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall en-
deavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated
in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained." One could interpret this
encouragement of amnesty to permit amnesties for any acts, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The overwhelming majority of commenta-
tors rightly conclude that the Protocol's drafters did not intend with this section
to undercut the numerous other provisions providing for the prosecution of those
responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See Margaret Popkin
& Nehal Bhuta, Latin American Amnesties in Comparative Perspective, EHics &
INT'L AFl. 99, 103 (1999) (citing letter to Margaret Popkin from Toni Pfanner,
Head of Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross Headquar-
ters, Geneva, Apr. 5, 1997, to the effect that Article 6(5) was not meant to apply
to grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions). The Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights quotes a letter from the ICRC to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia supporting this interpretation.
The letter states in relevant part:
The preparatory work for Article 6(5) indicates that the purpose of this
precept is to encourage amnesty, . . . as a type of liberation at the end of
hostilities for those who were detained or punished merely for having par-
ticipated in the hostilities. It does not seek to be an amnesty for those who
have violated international humanitarian law.
Parada Cea v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.102, doc. 6
(1999); see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurispru-
dence of Amnesty, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 843, 863-66 (1998) (providing strong argu-
ments for a narrow interpretation of Article 6(5) based on text, intent, and
policy).
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CHOICE OF BENEFICIARIES
One of the most important decisions facing an amnesty
drafter is the choice of beneficiaries. There exists a continuum of
choices, ranging from an amnesty that applies to every individual
for all time, to an amnesty that applies to one individual for one
specific event. The first end of this continuum provides no col-
lective system for holding individuals accountable for their acts.
Near this end of the continuum is an amnesty that applies to all
individuals for all acts committed prior to a certain date. A num-
ber of amnesties have taken this approach." Moving further
along this continuum are amnesties that are limited not only tem-
porally but also by beneficiary qualifications. Thus, some amnes-
ties protect a class of individuals for any act committed prior to a
cut-off date - for example all members of a military force, or all
members of a government, or all individuals involved in a partic-
ular conflict."l Some amnesties protect all individuals for a lim-
ited set of acts, for example all those who committed a
politically-motivated act, or all those who tortured or killed. 2
This section focuses on the choice of amnesty beneficiaries, spe-
cifically whether there is a difference between granting amnesty
'0 For example, Nicaragua passed a law in 1990 providing amnesty to "[ajll Ni-
caraguans" who committed crimes against the public order and security of the
State. Law No. 81 on General Amnesty and National Reconciliation (1990), art.
1(2), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 591-92 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter "3
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE"].
The 1995 Peruvian amnesty, for example, applies only to members of the military,
police, and civilian agents of the state. See Human Rights Committee, Comments
on Peru, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67, 9 (1996). The 1986 Uruguayan law
only applies to police and military officials. It was passed, however, to supple-
ment an earlier amnesty that applied to all persons except for members of the
police or military accused of the commission of certain criminal acts. Law No. 15,
848 (Law Nullifying the State's Claim to Punish Certain Crimes) (Dec. 22, 1986),
art. 1, reproduced in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 598.
The 1995 South African amnesty is limited to "acts associated with a political
objective." The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of
1995) (South Africa) § 20 (setting forth the requirement that an act be associated
with a political objective and that the applicant make full disclosure of all rele-
vant facts in order to qualify for amnesty). Likewise, kidnapping, extortion, and
drug related crimes are specifically excluded from eligibility under the 1993 El
Salvadoran amnesty. See Law on General Amnesty for the Consolidation of
Peace (Decree No. 486) (Mar. 20, 1993), art. 3(b), reproduced in 3 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 547.
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to political or military leaders, and granting amnesty to followers
or "foot-soldiers." In particular, what are the consequences of
such a choice on the effectiveness and justness of an amnesty?
International law provides some basis for distinguishing be-
tween superiors and subordinates in a chain of command. As a
general rule, superiors cannot evade responsibility for violations
of international law committed by their subordinates, and subor-
dinates cannot evade responsibility for their own violations by
hiding behind superior orders. In both cases liability is not abso-
lute. Superiors can be held responsible for the wrongful acts of
their subordinates,13 echoing the general agency principle of re-
spondent superior. The easy case is when the superior orders a
wrongful act; the superior is then held liable for the resulting un-
lawful act caused by the implementation of that order. Further, a
superior may be liable for wrongful conduct that he did not order
if it can be shown that the superior knew or should have known
about the wrongful conduct and did nothing to prevent it.14 At
the same time, subordinates who commit wrongful acts that
cause harm are liable even if the act was committed pursuant to
the order of a superior so long as it can be shown that the order
or act were manifestly illegal.15 Although following orders does
not provide an absolute defense to liability, it may be used to
mitigate the subordinate's punishment.
13 See Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, reprinted in Diplomatic Conference
on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflict, Protocols I & II to the Geneva Conventions, 16 I.L.M.
1391 (1977); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth ses-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 34-39, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996). See also Statute of the ICC, art. 28.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 999, 1017 (1998); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, art. 7(3), U.N.
Doc. 5/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175; Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal of Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1,
art. 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1604-05.
Article 33 of the Statute of the ICC provides that following orders is a valid
defense only if 1) the person was under a legal obligation to obey, and 2) the
person did not know the order was unlawful, and 3) the order was not to commit
genocide, crimes against humanity, or other manifestly unlawful acts. Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 14, 37 ILM at 1019.
Vol. 22, No. I
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Argentina is one of the few countries that passed a general
amnesty distinguishing between superiors and subordinates.16
The Argentinean "Due Obedience" law establishes an irrebut-
table presumption that a subordinate who committed a violation
acted under orders without any ability to resist or to assess the
orders' lawfulness. 7 In other words, subordinates are not liable
for their wrongful acts. The presumption does not apply to the
most senior military officials. The Argentinean amnesty thus
leaves exposed to liability the most senior leaders and not the
followers." Similarly, the 1994 Cambodian amnesty excludes
"leaders," thus nominally making a distinction between superiors
and subordinates. (The 1994 amnesty does not, however, define
"leader.") The 1996 amnesty, on the other hand, singles out one
particular superior, leng Sary.
Does it matter whether an amnesty focuses on subordinates
or superiors? The answer to this question requires reference to
two different approaches to the legitimacy of amnesties: a
"rights-based" approach and a "social order" approach. The
rights-based approach depends on our collective sense of justice
and morality. The social order approach, while certainly not un-
concerned with justice and morality, depends much more than
the first on empirical arguments concerning stability and social
peace. The rights-based approach focuses on the rights of indi-
vidual victims and asserts that there are certain fundamental
rights that must be protected by the state, including the right to
16 The 1863 amnesty passed by President Lincoln during the US civil war is another
amnesty that distinguished between superiors and subordinates, applying its ben-
efit only to "military leaders." JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AM-
NESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON 35 (1953) (noting that the 1863 amnesty
does not apply to military leaders over the rank of colonel in the army or lieuten-
ant in the navy).
17 Law No. 23,521 (June 4, 1987), reproduced in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra
note 10, at 507. The protection of the Due Obedience law does not apply, how-
ever, "to crimes of rape, kidnapping and hiding of minors, change of civil status,
and appropriation of immovables through extortion." Id. at art. 2. The Due
Obedience law was upheld by the Argentinean Supreme Court shortly after its
passage. See Constitutionality of the Law of "Due Obedience" and Dissenting
Opinion (Supreme Court of Argentina, Buenos Aires), 8 HUM. RTS. L. J. 2-4
(1987). In 2001, the Argentinean Supreme Court reversed this earlier decision
and struck down the due obedience law. See infra note 23.
18 Less than fifty officers were left unprotected by the law. See Naomi Roht-Ar-
riaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Vio-
lations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 459-60 (1990).
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truth, accountability, acknowledgment, participation, and repara-
tions. The rights-based approach focuses on an amnesty's contri-
bution to the fulfillment of these rights. The social order
response focuses on the empirical question of whether an am-
nesty results in a substantial lessening of violence and violations
and the creation of a peaceful social order. The social order ap-
proach assumes that "peace" is defined relatively thinly as an ab-
sence of conflict, and not defined more thickly as including an
absence of conflict based on a minimum requirement of social
justice.
Defenders of the rights-based approach argue that states
have a primary obligation to protect and further the fundamental
rights of individuals, and that peace and stability will only be
achieved if the rights of victims are recognized, vindicated, and
protected. Defenders of the social order approach argue that too
great a focus on the rights of victims, especially holding perpetra-
tors accountable, will undermine efforts to create a stable social
order. Whether truth, accountability, acknowledgment, partici-
pation, and reparations contribute to genuine social peace after a
period of gross violations of human rights presents an empirical
question, that is so far unresolved by the available evidence. A
similar inquiry asks whether the rule of law and individual ac-
countability more generally contribute to a just and stable soci-
ety; the overwhelming consensus is that they do.
The case of amnesties for human rights abuses presents a
narrower question: whether creating an exception from the nor-
mal application of individual accountability when the powerful
abuse their power is necessary for, compatible with, or detrimen-
tal to, a stable and just society. Post-Franco Spain is the best
illustration of the assertion that forced amnesia, whether through
a formal amnesty or an informal system of impunity, provides a
stable peace. Spain responded to the end of the Franco regime
not by engaging in inquiries and prosecutions for clear violations
that occurred under the dictator but by refusing to even acknowl-
edge that violations occurred. Spain did not descend into civil
conflict, but instead developed into a relatively stable and peace-
ful democracy. Post-Vichy France, post-Civil War United States,
and even post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia also provide examples of
impunity coupled with relative peace and security.
Vol 22, No. 1
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The rights-based and social order approaches differ in the
importance they place on deterrence. The effectiveness of ac-
countability in preventing future violations is an important con-
sideration for defenders of the rights-based approach.
Conversely, defenders of the social order approach place less
faith in the effectiveness of deterrence. This analysis of the im-
portance of deterrence is somewhat simplified; a full understand-
ing of the role and importance of deterrence must take into
account the different effects of immunizing subordinates or
superiors.
An amnesty that focuses on subordinates, or foot soldiers,
provides a benefit to the individual most immediately responsible
for a violation such as a torturer. Such an amnesty, if coupled
with a truth requirement like the South African amnesty, pro-
vides detailed forensic information about specific violations: who
did what to whom; how, where, and when a victim died; where a
victim's body might be found. While most victims are interested
in these sorts of details, they are also interested in why certain
violations were committed, and why they, or their loved ones,
were the targets of such acts. Subordinates can provide some an-
swer to these questions. At the most basic level, they might be
able to provide information about why an individual was chosen
as a target, including who chose the target. They may also be
able to point the finger across and up the chain of command, and
thus not only increase the number of people publicly identified
with a particular atrocity but also reveal the system of repres-
sion-the formal policies and orders-that resulted in the
violations.
An amnesty limited to subordinates may provide a great
deal of specific forensic information about a particular atrocity.
However, it will also result in those who were most immediately
responsible for torture and other atrocities walking free with
minimal accountability and no punishment. Such an amnesty of-
fends the collective sense of justice and morality embodied in the
rights-based approach. A system of impunity for subordinates
has two important consequences. First, it means that the individ-
ual torturer may mingle among his victims with long term conse-
quences. For example, when the torturer shops at the same
market as his victims, the victims may experience additional
trauma and fear, and may engage in vigilante retribution.
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Second, providing amnesty to the torturer undercuts specific
and general deterrence. With respect to specific deterrence, im-
munizing the torturer allows an individual who has demonstrated
the capacity to inflict the most horrendous pain on another
human being to continue to operate freely in society. Such an
individual may be prone to other acts of violence and may be
susceptible to playing a similar violent role on behalf of another
political movement or even for non-political ends. With respect
to general deterrence, immunizing a torturer as part of a political
compromise sends a message that acts of extreme violence will
result in accountability only if they are not part of a successful
political movement, thus creating an incentive for wrongdoers to
lessen the prospect of punishment by causing the most amount of
disruption possible. The person who tortures alone will rarely, if
ever, be the subject of amnesty, while the torturer who acts on
behalf of a political movement that successfully challenges or
supplants the government may benefit from a negotiated
amnesty.
That said, limiting an amnesty to subordinates may further
justice in an important way: it may facilitate the prosecution and
accountability of superiors and leaders most responsible for cre-
ating the conditions, including the issuing of direct orders that
resulted in the gross violations of human rights committed by
those same subordinates. An amnesty for subordinates may fa-
cilitate such accountability in two ways. First, by pointedly omit-
ting superiors, it focuses public attention through criminal trials
or other mechanisms of accountability on those individuals most
responsible for the conditions that led to the violations. Sec-
ondly, such an amnesty may result in testimony and other infor-
mation from subordinates that can be used to hold superiors
accountable. With the threat of prosecution removed, subordi-
nates will be more willing to come forward and testify.
Holding superiors accountable provides important benefits
to a transitional society. Superiors are closely identified with the
reign of terror they created or oversaw: they are the Pinochets,
the Hitlers, the Pol Pots, and those just below them, the Con-
treras's, the Eichmanns, and the Sarys. They are thus highly sym-
bolic figures whose prosecution and accountability act as an
important proxy for holding their governments and associates ac-
countable for their collective acts of wrongdoing. Moreover,
Vol 22, No. 1
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holding superiors accountable furthers in an important way spe-
cial and general deterrence. Accountability for superiors fur-
thers special deterrence by decreasing the possibility that they
and their associates will regain power and oversee a similar reign
of terror and violations. Accountability for superiors furthers
general deterrence by discouraging others with political ambi-
tions from pursuing policies that result in gross violations of
human rights.
In addition to furthering these instrumental deterrence-
based goals, holding superiors and leaders accountable corre-
sponds to our collective moral sense that those most responsible
for systematic violations should be held accountable. Agnes Hel-
ler famously distinguished between "evil" and "bad" individu-
als.19 Evil individuals are those who promote, order, and create
the environment that results in or encourages gross violations of
human rights. They are subject to a high level of moral responsi-
bility for they are the ones who exercise the most choice. Bad
individuals are those who carry out the policies of evil individu-
als. They have less, although certainly still some, choice with re-
spect to their actions. They are the ones who agree to commit
atrocities because they are so ordered, they are seduced by politi-
cal ideology, they want to increase their standard of living, they
want to feed their family, or they want to avoid harm to their
family or themselves. Bad individuals are thus appropriately
subjected to a lower level of moral responsibility than evil indi-
viduals. Holding leaders accountable therefore satisfies a basic
idea of justice; that of just desert. Those individuals who are
most culpable, and who create the conditions for the commission
of the most heinous acts, are most deserving of being brought to
justice.
International law reflects this heightened sense of a supe-
rior's responsibility for both his own acts and some acts of his
subordinates. The legal doctrine of command responsibility, in
both the military and civilian contexts, supports the general idea
that leaders are more culpable and blameworthy than followers.
We do not hold a subordinate responsible for the acts of his
Agnes Heller, The Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox of Evil, in On Human
Rights 149 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
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superiors.2° We do, however, hold a superior responsible for the
acts of subordinates even if the superior did not have actual
knowledge of the acts of his subordinates if, given all the circum-
stances, he should have known of the abuses.
There are, however, strong arguments against shielding sub-
ordinates from accountability even if superiors are pursued.
Superiors are not always the defendant of choice for state prose-
cutors bringing criminal claims and victims bringing private civil
claims. Other issues besides moral culpability affect the decision
of whom to pursue. The availability of evidence, the obscenity of
the wrongful acts performed by the immediate violator, and the
legal and political resistance an individual can mount to deflect
efforts to hold him accountable are all factors that affect the deci-
sion to prosecute. Ironically, sensitivity to such considerations
usually results in an accountability strategy that focuses on sub-
ordinates and not leaders.
Evidence regarding the culpability of the immediate perpe-
trator is more easily discovered than evidence implicating some-
one situated higher up the chain of command. A torture victim,
for example, is more likely to be able to identify her immediate
torturer than the individual who ordered or encouraged the vio-
lation. The horrendous acts committed by the immediate perpe-
trator are more likely to stir the passions of the public and result
in a demand for justice than the more distant role of their superi-
ors. Such sentiments argue for an amnesty that is limited to
superiors and allows for the use of prosecution and other forms
of accountability against the individual torturers and killers. By
allowing victims to hold subordinates accountable, amnesties lim-
ited to superiors satisfy the important goals of justice and moral-
ity that are frustrated by a subordinate-only amnesty. By the
same token, such amnesties frustrate the important justice goals
that are satisfied by holding superiors accountable.
Providing amnesty to superiors is often justified as necessary
to facilitate a transition to a more human rights friendly society
20 Although we do alter our evaluation of the gravity of the crime committed by a
subordinate based upon the aggregate actions of superiors and others. Thus a
simple act of torture may constitute a crime against humanity if it is found to be a
part of a larger campaign of persecution and the individual torturer has some
knowledge of that larger campaign.
VoL 22, No. I
Wisconsin International Law Journal
and a peaceful social order. This is the primary argument of de-
fenders of the social order approach to amnesties. Without a
promise of amnesty, those who hold the reins of power and ter-
ror will not willingly step aside. Providing amnesty to such
superiors can further human rights by preventing further viola-
tions and creating an opportunity for the creation of a more sta-
ble, just, and peaceful society. Not providing such an amnesty, in
turn, perpetuates injustice and may lead to additional violations.
The Cambodian amnesties illustrate the distinction between
granting amnesty for subordinates and superiors. The 1994 am-
nesty explicitly excludes "leaders" of the Khmer Rouge, thus lim-
iting itself to subordinates. All of the benefits identified earlier
with respect to such amnesties are thus available to support the
work of the proposed tribunal. Subordinates who were impor-
tant eye witnesses to both the violations that occurred as well as
to the chain of command that caused such violations should be
able and willing to provide evidence to the tribunal. This may
facilitate the successful prosecution of those high profile leaders
most associated with the crimes of the Khmer Rouge.
The singling out of Ieng Sary by the 1996 amnesty provides
the only possible exception to this window of opportunity to hold
leaders accountable. As noted above, amnesties to superiors are
often cited by defenders of the social order approach as crucial to
preventing future violations. The Cambodian government cited
such an argument to defend the amnesty provided to leng Sary,
noting that it was necessary to weaken and eventually eliminate
the military threat and the threat to human rights posed by the
insurgent Khmer Rouge. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it
is not clear this concession to leng Sary was necessary to defend
against the threat posed by the Khmer Rouge. On the other
hand, the amnesty is limited to one individual, leaving open the
possibility that other high level officials of the Khmer Rouge
might be open to prosecution or other forms of accountability.
In addition, the draft of the Statute for the Tribunal prohibits the
government from granting any amnesty beyond that granted to
Ieng Sary, and even suggests that the tribunal may curtail the
effect of Sary's amnesty.
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The possible erosion of Sary's amnesty after the dissipation
of the threat posed by the Khmer Rouge underscores the rela-
tionship between the rights based and social order approaches to
amnesty.
The decision to grant an amnesty to superiors is often a
choice between providing accountability for existing victims of
violations and preventing further violations. This dilemma is
often presented as a choice between peace and justice. Peace
and justice, however, are not unrelated; each is dependent on the
other. Injustice undermines peace, and conflict hinders account-
ability. Efforts to further the development and protection of
rights must involve both justice and conflict resolution. While
these two goals are often held up as antagonists, they are in fact
each necessary for the other. In other words, the rights-based
and social order approaches are more intimately intertwined
than many commentators are willing to admit. How, then, to fur-
ther the goals of both rather than pitting the one against the
other? A brief examination of the recent history of amnesty and
accountability in transitional societies suggests an answer. This
leads to the second issue concerning amnesties: how long should
such an amnesty last?
PEACE AND JUSTICE: THE TEMPORAL
REACH OF AMNESTIES
Amnesties are not meant to be temporary. Some amnesties
are only available for a limited period of time, although they are
almost always meant to be permanent by their grantors and re-
cipients.21 Governments that inherited from their predecessors
amnesties meant to be permanent have recently faced increasing
pressure to restrict and even annul such amnesties. Initially, such
2 In 1980, Iran granted amnesty to those who were imprisoned for certain non-
violent crimes conditional on them not committing the same or similar crime.
While this amnesty is meant to be permanent, it is one of the few that provide
conditions for its revocation. See message of Imam Khomeyni announcing the
amnesty, reproduced in Khomeyni's Declaration of a General Amnesty (BBC,
Mar. 20, 1980). Algeria passed an amnesty in 1999 that provided both for a gen-
eral permanent amnesty as well as a probationary period of from 3 to 10 years
during which an individual's conduct is monitored, and during which amnesty
may be revoked. See Law of Civil Harmony, Law No. 99-08, July 13, 1999, availa-
ble at http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/algeria/documents/law.htm.
Voi. 22, No. I
Wisconsin International Law Journal
challenges were brought within the domestic courts of the coun-
try that promulgated the amnesty and, until recently, all such
challenges have failed. By contrast, the few international courts
that have evaluated amnesties granted for gross violations of
human rights have found such amnesties illegal. Domestic pres-
sure by victim's groups and human rights advocates, along with
the advent of Pinochet-style transnational prosecutions that re-
fused to defer to foreign amnesties have emboldened domestic
courts to question the legitimacy of their own government's
amnesties.22 Argentinean judges, for example, began to chal-
lenge that country's amnesty laws,23 culminating in the formal re-
peal of those laws by the Argentinean Congress. Similar moves
have been made by Chilean judges to hold individuals accounta-
ble for gross violations of human rights committed during the Pi-
nochet dictatorship. 24
At the same time that courts have begun to curtail amnesties
both foreign and domestic, de facto grants of impunity resulting
from the failure to prosecute or otherwise address historical
crimes have also been challenged. The large number of cases
arising out of human rights violations committed during and in
connection with World War II-including claims arising from Nazi
seizures of gold and art, Italian and German insurance policies
The most famous such example is the Spanish court's willingness in the late
1990's to entertain a criminal prosecution against the Chilean dictator Augusto
Ugarte Pinochet despite the amnesty that his government granted to itself in
1978.
See Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Supreme Court Should Resist Army Pres-
sure, available at http://hrw.org/press/2003/03/argentina031203.htm. The report
notes that on March 7, 2003, a third judge struck down the applicability of the
Argentinean amnesty laws to killings that took place during that country's Dirty
War. The first such judgment, issued by Judge Cavallo on March 6, 2001, was
upheld by the Federal Court of Buenos Aires in November 2001. That decision is
currently pending before the Argentinean Supreme Court. For the original deci-
sion, see Resoluci6n del Cavallo, at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/uez-
cavallo03mar.html. See also Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Commitment on
Prosecutions Welcomed (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2001/12/argl218.htm (applauding a government decree "ensuring courts consider
for prosecution all future cases involving former military and police officers").
The Chilean Supreme Court in July 1999, for example, declared that the country's
1978 amnesty law did not apply to cases of disappearances. See Gustavo Gonza-
lez, Rights-Chile: 'Caravan of Death' Trial to Proceed Says High Court (July 21,
1999), available at Inter Press Service, http://www.oneworld.net/ips2/july99/oo_
14_001.html.
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that were never paid, and the use of slave labor by the Japanese
and German governments-illustrates a newfound zeal to pursue
violations that have lain dormant in the public consciousness for
decades. The current efforts to create a tribunal for prosecuting
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge more than two decades
ago is a more recent example of a revived determination to ad-
dress such historical crimes.
Post-Franco Spain, along with post-Vichy France, post-Civil
War United States, and post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia are all ex-
amples of such delayed accountability. They illustrate a trend in
state practice of granting immediate impunity which, after the
passage of time, gives way to accountability. Of all of these soci-
eties, the United States appears to be the most delayed in provid-
ing any form of direct accountability for the violation of slavery.
While reparations to victims of slavery were attempted shortly
after the U.S. Civil War, the descendants of U.S. slaves had to
wait a century later for formal legal and political recognition of
the right to be free of discrimination. In contrast, France waited
only a few decades after the end of World War II to begin to
identify and hold accountable individuals complicit in Nazi atroc-
ities, although such efforts have been minimal. Less than three
decades after the fall of Franco, Spain has begun to examine its
violative past. Cambodia has been one of the most active of
these four examples, publicly discussing the atrocities of the
Khmer Rouge through debates over accountability and through
the preservation and public exposure of Khmer Rouge atrocities
through such institutions as the Genocide Museum at Tuol Sleng.
Of course, in all four cases accountability has been minimal, and
while the social cost of allowing decades to pass before identify-
ing and holding individuals accountable is undoubtedly signifi-
cant, it is difficult to quantify.
These examples illustrate how the passage of time may in-
crease the political will to hold individuals accountable for past
atrocities. This should come as no surprise as the passage of time
has always affected justice. One common manifestation of jus-
tice's sensitivity to time is statutes of limitation.25 Immunities
also illustrate the relationship between the passage of time and
There are others as well, including the equitable doctrine of laches. Most of the
observations I make concerning statutes of limitation also apply to other similar
legal mechanisms like laches.
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accountability. The effect of statutes of limitation is the opposite
of amnesties in that the former initially allow claims to be
brought and then bar such claims after the passage of the statu-
tory amount of time. Immunities are more like amnesties in that
they bar claims immediately upon the occurrence of a wrongful
act. The policies underlying statutes of limitation and head of
state and diplomatic immunities, along with current trends in the
law with respect to all three, also provide insights into the con-
temporary treatment and legitimacy of amnesties.
Statutes of limitation establish the temporal point at which
the pursuit of accountability risks injustice. Claims for wrongs
committed in the distant past are viewed with trepidation for two
major reasons: (1) they present high evidentiary barriers, and (2)
they disrupt reasonable expectations of social stability and cer-
tainty. The ability to establish and corroborate evidence be-
comes more difficult with the passage of time. For example,
witnesses die, move away, or become less confident in their
recollections. Documents deteriorate or disappear. Statutes of
limitation are thus designed to make sure that matters are raised
and adjudicated before the onset of such evidentiary concerns.
In addition, statutes of limitation protect reasonable expec-
tations of stability and certainty by requiring that defendants be
given timely notice of any claim against them. By establishing a
time after which a claim may not be brought, statutes of limita-
tion provide closure and certainty with respect to liability.26 In
fact, this latter justification, concerning notice to potential de-
fendants, is probably stronger than the evidentiary concern, since
legal systems regularly tolerate the passage of a fair amount of
time between the filing of a complaint and the testing of evidence
through the evidentiary rigors of a trial.
Concerns about stale evidence and the desire for closure are
given less weight in cases involving the most extreme violations,
and in cases where the delay in bringing a claim is caused by
26 See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944) ("Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in
their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory
is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.").
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forces outside of the control of the claimant. Thus, the more seri-
ous a violation, the longer the period of limitation. For example,
the crime of murder, is not subject to any period of limitation in
most U.S. states.27 Under international law, war crimes and
crimes against humanity are not subject to any period of limita-
tion.28 Limitation periods may be equitably tolled if, for example,
the defendant fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of
action; the plaintiff is subject to a legal disability, such as infancy,
insanity, or imprisonment; or the plaintiff is prevented from filing
suit by force of law.29
The policies underlying an extended statute of limitation for
the most serious crimes, and tolling in cases of fraud and other
circumstances, provide a serious challenge to the legitimacy of
amnesties. While amnesties are like statutes of limitation in that
they create a barrier to accountability, they differ in usually pro-
viding no opportunity for such accountability. Amnesties usually
apply to the most serious offences, such as those for which there
is a long or no limitation period, and in fact create the sort of
barrier to accountability that justifies extending, through tolling,
the period during which a claim may be brought.
Diplomatic and head of state immunities are more like
amnesties than statutes of limitations. These immunities present
a less serious challenge to an amnesty's legitimacy. Like amnes-
ties they bar claims for accountability immediately following a
27 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06, cmt. 2(a) (noting that murder, treason, and
other crimes of comparable magnitude often have no limitation period).
See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; European Con-
vention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Hu-
manity and War Crimes, opened for signature Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82,
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540. For an example of the application of this principle in
practice, see Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes
and Others v. Barbie, Cass. Crim [Criminal Chamber], Dec. 20, 1985, translated in
78 I.L.R. 125 (French prosecution brought against individual for Nazi-era atroci-
ties decades after the commission of the underlying acts).
29 Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1220-37 (1950) (discussing postponement and suspension of statutes of limita-
tion). Suspension of statutes of limitation when plaintiffs have been prevented
from filing suit by force of law does not appear to refer to amnesties, but to
statutes and injunctions that temporarily protect a defendant from being sued.
The authors of this comprehensive survey cite as an example an Alabama statute
that prohibits suit against a personal representative for a specified period after
qualification. Id. at 1233, n.466.
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violation. Also like some amnesties, after a period of time these
immunities fall away and open the door to accountability. Un-
like amnesties, however, the life of immunities is not tied to the
mere passage of time, but to the official status of the immunized
individual. Immunities generally attach to an office, and only de-
rivatively to the individual who holds that office; the immunity
usually does not remain with the individual after she leaves her
official position. Despite these differences, immunities do share
an important similarity with the emerging trend of amnesties in
practice: they usually delay, rather than prohibit, accountability.
Those who defend head of state immunity justify it as pro-
tecting the nature and dignity of the office, promoting comity and
mutual respect among nations, and helping to improve the stabil-
ity of international relations and diplomacy. 0 Similarly, defend-
ers of granting diplomatic immunity to state officials cite to the
importance of preserving relations among states and facilitating
the official actions of state representatives.3
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently issued a
decision reaffirming the importance of diplomatic immunity be-
cause of the crucial functions performed by, in that case, a Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs." The court's opinion was careful to note,
however, that it was only deciding the effect of diplomatic immu-
nity on a national court's assertion of criminal jurisdiction. The
court specifically noted that its reasoning did not apply to asser-
tions of jurisdiction by an international tribunal or to a former
state official. In fact, prior to the ICJ decision, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reflected the mod-
ern trend concerning such immunities and approved the first in-
ternational indictment against a sitting head of state, Solobodan
Milosovic. The ICJ decision does not challenge that indictment,
specifically noting that its reasoning does not apply to assertions
of jurisdiction by an international criminal court.
" See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (mentioning all
of these justifications).
31 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of Apr. 11, 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium) If 53-55, 41 I.L.M. 536, 549-50 (2002) (affirming the func-
tional arguments in favor of official immunities under international law).
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Assertions of accountability against sitting heads of state are
limited and controversial. Assertions of jurisdiction against for-
mer heads of state and officials, however, are much more widely
accepted. While this may mean that claims may not be allowed
until many years, if not decades, after the underlying event, the
policies that justify extending and tolling limitation periods can
also be used to justify the delayed assertion of claims against a
state official.
Statutes of limitation and immunities allow accountability
long after the occurrence of the underlying crime. The evolving
practice of amnesties, which confers immunity immediately and
then is later lifted, is similar to the more formal practice of diplo-
matic immunity and tolling of limitations.33 In both cases ac-
countability is delayed, but not foreclosed.
Accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge follows
this evolving practice of amnesties. With the exception of the
Vietnamese-sponsored trial in absentia in 1979, there has been no
mechanism for holding members of the Khmer Rouge accounta-
ble for their violations. It is only now, close to three decades
after the event, that a serious effort to provide accountability has
begun.
The evolving practice of states with respect to amnesties sug-
gests the creation of a limited amnesty that may continue to be
attractive to its beneficiaries while at the same time providing
some possibility of accountability. State practice with respect to
amnesties approximates something like a reverse statute of limi-
tations: a period of time during which accountability is initially
barred, and then later allowed. This practice could be incorpo-
rated into a formal rule of international law that would allow the
granting of an amnesty that would last for only five or ten years.
At the end of that period, an evaluation could be made to deter-
mine if the beneficiary of the amnesty is entitled to a permanent
amnesty or something less. Such a determination could be based
3' A potentially significant difference between amnesties, on the one hand, and lim-
itations and immunities on the other concerns the initial expectations of both.
Recipients of amnesties assume that the amnesty is permanent, and may have
acted accordingly by, for example, giving up power. The jurisprudence concern-
ing immunities and the tolling of limitations make it less reasonable for a recipi-
ent to claim unfulfilled expectations upon the later assertion of accountability.
Given growing state practice a similar argument might be made for amnesties,
especially those that apply to gross violations of human rights.
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upon the actions of the beneficiary during the "probationary"
limited amnesty period. This would create an incentive for bene-
ficiaries (1) to show through their words and deeds that they no
longer pose a threat to society; (2) to provide personal repara-
tions not only to their immediate victims but to the larger society;
and (3) to model human rights positive behavior to similarly situ-
ated individuals who might otherwise commit or sponsor gross
violations of human rights. It is important that the life span of
the initial amnesty be at least five years, both to provide a sweet
enough "carrot" to induce the recipient to give up power and to
provide enough time for the beneficiary to demonstrate more
than a superficial commitment to human rights and the rule of
law. A permanent amnesty at the end of the probationary period
might be rare, and could be conditioned on further demonstra-
tions of support, such as participating in a truth commission, tes-
tifying at the trial of others, or otherwise assisting in
investigations. If a permanent amnesty is not granted, the insuf-
ficient actions during the probationary period could be used in
mitigation during any subsequent criminal or civil action.
The two Cambodian amnesties are now nine and seven years
old. Both were justified as necessary to entice defections from
the exiled Khmer Rouge. That function is no longer necessary
today, and the emerging trend of the law of amnesties suggests
that such amnesties should be weakened, if not reversed, by the
tribunal. The drafters of the tribunal statute clearly envision
such a situation. The statute explicitly prohibits the Cambodian
government from granting in the future any amnesty or pardon
to "any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of
crimes" covered by the tribunal."34 With respect to amnesties
and pardons already granted by the Cambodian government, the
statute makes specific reference to the 1996 pardon and amnesty
to leng Sary. While the drafters do not reverse Sary's protection,
they grant to the tribunal the power to review his amnesty.35
There is no reference in the tribunal statute to the 1994 am-
nesty. As noted above, the 1994 amnesty was limited to subordi-
nates. Such a limitation means that the more publicly identified
leaders responsible for the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge remain
C.A. Res. 57/2288, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., art. 11(1) (2003).
3' Id. at art. 11(2).
The Cambodian Amnesties
open to prosecution, - including Ieng Sary. At the same time the
more numerous subordinates of the Khmer Rouge will continue
to be free to circulate among their former victims with impunity.
So long as the tribunal is empowered to revisit the 1996 amnesty,
there is no reason to preclude a similar examination of the 1994
amnesty. Empowering the tribunal to review the 1994 amnesty
would provide an opportunity for the tribunal to use its discre-
tion to grant the "carrot" of continued immunity to entice subor-
dinates to provide evidence concerning atrocities, including the
identity of the superiors under whose orders they acted. This
would preserve the benefits of an amnesty limited to subordi-
nates, while at the same time holding some individuals who per-
formed the actual tortures and killings accountable.
CONCLUSION
Answering the "who" and "how long" questions of amnesty
influence the legitimacy of an amnesty, but are not in themselves
decisive. While some argue that all amnesties are by nature ille-
gitimate, I have argued elsewhere that some types of amnesties
can qualify as legitimate. Amnesties can be divided into three
broad categories: amnesic, compromise, and accountable.36 The
Cambodian amnesties are amnesic. Their primary purpose is to
conceal and forget, rather than reveal and account. They provide
no accountability, no benefits to victims, and no revelations con-
cerning the violations of the amnesty's beneficiaries and are thus
illegitimate.
"An amnesty is "accountable" if it imposes some form of accountability on wrong-
doers and provides some relief or reparations to victims. The 1995 South African
amnesty is the only amnesty that currently qualifies as an accountable amnesty.
Compromise amnesties fall between accountable and amnesic amnesties, and
partially reveal and partially conceal. Amnesties passed in Guatemala and Hon-
duras are good examples of compromise amnesties. For the Honduran amnesty
see Vladimir Recinos, Honduran Supreme Court Rules Against Military Officers'
Petition, F.B.I.S. LAT 96-015 (Jan. 23, 1996); Honduras, Corte Suprema de Jus-
ticia, Recurso de Amparo en Revision, No. 60-96, case Hernandez Santos y otros
(Tegucigalpa Jan. 18, 1996). For the Guatemalan amnesty see Margaret Popkin,
Guatemala's National Reconciliation Law: Combating Impunity or Continuing it?,
24 REVISTA IIDH 173 (1996). I have discussed in more detail these three catego-
ries of amnesties in Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties under Interna-
tional Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate
Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173 (2002). There is a fourth category,
corrective amnesties, that is not applicable to this discussion.
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The substantive differences between the two Cambodian
amnesties illustrate the important issues underlying choice of
beneficiaries. Their implementation in light of the recent agree-
ment to create a criminal tribunal to try members of the Khmer
Rouge illustrates the contemporary ambiguity with respect to
amnesties for such serious crimes and the contemporary pressure
to limit the reach and strength of such amnesties. The recent
agreement to create a tribunal to hold members of the Khmer
Rouge accountable is a welcome development. It would be a
shame to mar such a development by recognizing and giving le-
gitimacy to the illegitimate Cambodian amnesties.
The current draft agreement between the UN and the
Cambodian Government for the creation of a tribunal, which as
of this writing is still awaiting formal approval by the Cambodian
Parliament, does not take a very strong stand against the recogni-
tion of amnesties. It forbids the future granting of amnesties by
the Cambodian government to persons suspected of abuses dur-
ing the Khmer Rouge period, but does not forbid the recognition
of amnesties granted prior to the coming into force of the tribu-
nal agreement.37 As noted, the agreement makes a specific refer-
ence to the 1996 amnesty granted to leng Sary, but instead of
clarifying its legitimacy, it leaves to the tribunal judges the deci-
sion of whether to review and limit Sary's amnesty.38 While disap-
pointing, this decision to defer to the judges opens the possibility
that Sary could in effect be the recipient of a limited amnesty as
described above. Sary has already enjoyed seven years of formal
immunity from prosecution. If he were to be tried and convicted
by the tribunal, his sentence could be mitigated if he has demon-
strated adequate remorse and rehabilitation through acts of rec-
onciliation and personal reparation. The current draft agreement
would not preclude the judges from making such a decision. As
recommended above, the tribunal should also be given the same
power with respect to the 1994 amnesty. This would allow the
tribunal to put pressure on subordinates to testify in return for
continued immunity, and thus increase our knowledge of atroci-
ties committed during the Khmer Rouge period and provide cru-
cial evidence that can be used to prosecute those most
C.A. Res 57/2288, supra note 34.
3 Id. at art. 11(2).
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responsible for such atrocities. If they are given the chance, and
have the courage to do so, the tribunal judges might piece to-
gether a limited amnesty that contributes to both truth and jus-
tice, and thus make an important contribution to the creation of
a rule of international law that recognizes the important political
realities facing transitional societies without ignoring the impor-
tance of accountability for gross violations of human rights.

